Budget and Procurement Bottlenecks
India allocates a sizeable defense budget (₹6.2 lakh crore or $75 billion in 2024–25), but procurement processes hinder timely modernization. A recent analysis bluntly calls the acquisition system a “bureaucratic quicksand.” Key issues include:
Delays and Red Tape: The Defense Acquisition Procedure (DAP) involves 12 stages of approvals. In practice, this causes years long delays. For example, the Tejas program sanctioned in 1983 – took 36 years for its first squadron. The Army’s Integrated Battle Group (IBG) reorganization languished for 4+ years with no progress. Such inertia often renders equipment obsolete by the time it arrives, a major problem given fast paced tech cycles.
HAL Production Shortfalls: HAL, India’s aerospace manufacturing giant, repeatedly misses targets. As of 2024, HAL had delivered only 36 Tejas (Mk1) out of 123 on order. The Mk1A production bottlenecks (engine supply, structural issues) have meant that no Mk1A was delivered by mid 2025. Similar woes afflicted the indigenous Light Combat Helicopter and Su-30 upgrades. HAL’s chronic delays led the MoD to form a Defence Empowerment Committee (led by the Defence Secretary) to inject urgency into projects. In 2025, Parliament even passed a ₹67,000 Cr supplement to finance 97 Tejas Mk1As (above the 83 order), partly reflecting this push.
Imports vs. Make in India Dilemma: India strives for self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat). However, even as it develops domestic jets, 70% of defense equipment is still imported. Strategic procurement is thus caught between buying “off-the-shelf” to plug gaps (e.g. 36 Rafales, tanker/AWACS deals) and nurturing domestic industry (LCA, AMCA, etc.). This tension can slow decision making; for instance, debates over foreign vs. local content delayed some deals. Corruption scandals (AgustaWestland, Rafale) have also sown mistrust and bureaucratic caution.
Budget Constraints: Although the budget is large, defense spending as a percentage of GDP is declining. Competing priorities (infrastructure, welfare) limit allocatable funds. Moreover, major capital acquisitions (fighters, ships, missiles) often get cutback in favor of personnel or revenue needs. This leaves inadequate funds to recapitalize all services at once.
Overall, procurement inertia and budgetary pressures have exacerbated India’s fighter shortage. Each delayed contract or slow-build jet means one more squadron precariously left vacant. Defense thinkers warn that without streamlining procurement (e.g. fewer layers of approval, engaging private sector) and prioritizing critical buys, the IAF will remain chronically understrength.
