Pakistan’s Air Force: Modernization Drive
Pakistan remains a critical concern. Although its air arm is smaller (25 squadrons, 450–500 fighters), the PAF has undertaken an aggressive modernization in recent years:
JF-17 Thunder: The backbone of PAF’s fleet. About 150+ JF-17s have been built in Pakistan (Block-I, II, and III variants). The latest Block-III jets (with AESA radar, IRST, helmet mounted display) began inducting in 2023. Pakistan also recently showcased JF-17 exports (Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Myanmar) and is planning a next-gen “JF-17 PFX” to replace the oldest airframes. The JF-17 production line is reportedly expanding (22–24 jets/year delivered recently).
F-16 Fighting Falcons: Pakistan operates around 80–90 F-16s (Block 15/52), mostly upgraded under US/FMS programs. These remain potent multirole jets with modern missiles. Islamabad also briefly renamed F-16s as “F-21” to pitch to India in the MRFA tender. However, the U.S. supplies are now limited; Pakistan’s focus has shifted to Chinese jets.
J-10CE and J-31: China’s deepening role. In 2022–23 Pakistan took delivery of 30+ J-10CE fighters (export variant of China’s J-10C). These are larger, longer range fighters equipped with PL-15 missiles, and represent the PAF’s entry into 4.5-generation jets. Pakistan also claimed a deal to acquire Chengdu J-31 (“Gyrfalcon”) stealth jets, though details are murky. Even talk of a joint 5th gen project (with Turkey) is underway.
Survivability and Drones: The PAF has also bolstered AWACS (Saab 2000 Erieye) and inducted Turkish Akinci TB-2/UAVs to improve situational awareness. Improved Chinese surface to air missiles (HQ-9, HQ-16) add a formidable air defense umbrella over Pakistan.
The net effect is that Pakistan’s air power is resurging. Some estimates suggest the PAF could even approach numerical parity with India’s fighter count by 2035 if trends continue. Crucially, Islamabad is narrowing the gap in capabilities: the PAF’s new AESA radars, beyond visual range missiles (e.g. PL-15), and planned stealth jets threaten to negate India’s qualitative edge. In practical terms, India can no longer assume air superiority over Pakistan. Combined with smaller size, this means any conflict with Pakistan will be fought on a much tougher playing field than in the 1990s.