New Delhi – India’s air combat power is under strain. The Indian Air Force (IAF) currently fields only about 30 combat squadrons (roughly 520–550 fighters) against a doctrinal requirement of 42–45. This is the lowest strength in decades. It’s for India fighter jet crisis and it may create severe problem. By contrast, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has around 2,000 fighter aircraft (50+ squadrons, including advanced J-20 stealth fighters), and Pakistan’s Air Force fields roughly 25 squadrons (450–500 aircraft, including F-16s and JF-17s). Widely cited estimates warn that by late 2025 India’s strength may dip to 29 squadrons, barely edging Pakistan’s count. This shortfall has serious national security implications: the IAF’s leadership publicly acknowledges it cannot sustain a full two front air campaign with current numbers.
Current Squadron Strength vs. Requirement
The Indian government long ago sanctioned a target of 42 fighter squadrons (the Thirteenth Plan even envisaged 45 by 2027). In reality, the IAF today maintains only about 30 active squadrons. (A typical Indian squadron fields 16–20 jets.) Even on paper this leaves roughly 12 fewer squadrons than mandated; in practice the shortfall is deeper because many aging jets are cannibalized or “number-plated” (kept only administratively active). IAF chiefs have repeatedly stressed that without reaching at least the 42 squadron mark, the force will struggle to simultaneously guard borders with Pakistan and China. As Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa warned in 2018, “numbers were not adequate to execute a full air campaign in a two-front scenario.”
Comparatively, China’s PLAAF is vastly larger. Estimates put China at roughly 3,000 total aircraft with about 1,975 fighters. Even discounting older types, China fields 50+ fighter squadrons, many equipped with modern 4th/5th-generation jets (Su-30/MK2, J-10, J-11, and now J-20 stealth fighters).
Pakistan, India’s other primary adversary, has roughly 25 squadrons (450–500 fighters). Pakistan’s fleet includes MiG-era Mirages, 80+ modern F-16s (Block 15/52 variants), and over 130 JF-17 “Thunder” jets developed with China. India’s current numerical disadvantage with barely more jets than Pakistan and far fewer than China is often highlighted by analysts as a looming crisis.
Aging Fleet and Retirement Trends
India’s shortage is aggravated by the aging of legacy aircraft and their slated retirements. Several fighter types from the 1970s-90s era are nearing the end of service:
- MiG-21 Bison: Once the backbone of the IAF, the MiG-21 has already been nearly phased out. The last two Bison squadrons were slated for retirement by 2025. The IAF ended MiG-21 production in 2013, and only a handful of upgraded Bisons remain in service as of 2025.
- SEPECAT Jaguar: India’s strike fighter Jaguar began induction in the 1970s. Analysts project the Jaguar fleet will complete its life by circa 2032–33, removing about 3 squadrons by then.
- Dassault Mirage-2000: India’s Mirage-2000 (inducted 1980s) is due to retire in the early 2030s, along with its 3 squadrons.
- MiG-29 Fulcrum: The twin engine MiG-29 entered IAF service in the 1980s. With only 40 upgraded MiG-29s now, the plan is to phase them out as the Tejas Mk2 and other replacements arrive around 2033–35.
- MiG-27 and MiG-23: The MiG-27 (ground attack variant of the MiG-23) and MiG-23 themselves have already been retired (MiG-27s ended service in 2019).
- Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk1: India’s only modern indigenous fighter (Tejas) has yet to reach full force levels. The IAF formed just two Tejas Mk1 squadrons (38 jets) as of 2024, far short of requirements.
- Other types: The lone Hawker Hunter and a few remaining MiG-21 variants also exited service.
The replacement rate is glacial. For instance, a European defense review notes that even if planned additions occur, squadron count may only rise to 35–36 by the mid 2030s still well below the 42 target. In short, India is losing squadrons faster than it can replace them. Without urgent remedies, the IAF risks squeezing below 30 squadrons in the coming years, an unprecedented nadir.
Delays in Indigenous Modernization Programs
India’s solution partly lies in indigenous development: the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) variants and future advanced fighters. Yet these programs have faced repeated delays and production shortfalls.
Tejas Mk1A: A Rs. 48,000 crore deal (2021) ordered 83 improved Tejas Mk1A fighters. HAL was to deliver the first by March 2024, but missed the deadline. Engine shortages and certifications have slowed output: the first GE F404-Mk20 engine only arrived in March 2025 (nearly 2 years late). By mid 2025, only 36 Tejas Mk1 (baseline) have been delivered to IAF; no Mk1A had yet entered service. HAL now promises 16 Tejas Mk1A per year and aims to complete all 83 by 2028. Meanwhile, the IAF plans a follow-on order for 97 more Mk1As (boosting total Tejas to 180). Despite these efforts, the slowdown has already exacerbated the squadron shortfall: retiring MiGs and Jaguars have outpaced new Tejas inductions.
Tejas Mk2 (Medium Weight Fighter): The Mk2 is a more powerful 4.5 generation variant (F414 engine, canards, longer range). The prototype is under construction, with rollout targeted by late 2025. Initial flight is expected by early 2026. However, full production only begins around 2029. Plans call for 120 Mk2 aircraft by 2034 (about 6 squadrons), but this is optimistic. HAL’s production lines are still being reconfigured, and any delays would further defer frontline impact.
AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft): India’s first 5th generation fighter design. The MoD approved an execution model for AMCA in May 2025. The DRDO has committed to delivering the first prototype by 2032 and full deployment by 2035. This “new dawn” project promises stealth, supercruise, internal bays, etc. But note, even with the 2024 Cabinet approval, the prototype won’t fly for 10 years. AMCA thus won’t contribute to force strength until the mid 2030s at the earliest. An international JV for its engine is in discussion (to avoid repeating the Kaveri failure).
Each of these programs is crucial, but their timelines are protracted. For example, the original Tejas Mk1 was sanctioned in 1983 and only entered service in 2019 – over 35 years in the making. Such delays force the IAF to hang on to outdated jets longer. The message is clear: faster induction of Tejas variants and AMCA is critical to narrow the capability gap.
MRFA (114 Multi Role Fighters) Program
To urgently refill squadrons, India resurrected the Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) tender for 114 jets (essentially the long delayed successor to the scrapped 126 jet MMRCA deal). This procurement (over ₹1.5 lakh crore) is meant to import advanced jets with local production under Make in India. After years of deliberation, recent reports indicate renewed momentum:
Tender status: The IAF issued an RFI in 2018 with seven global contenders (Boeing F/A-18E/F, F-15EX, Lockheed Martin F-21 [F-16 variant], Dassault Rafale, Saab Gripen E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon, MiG-35, Su-35). Officially the tender is still pending. A newly formed high level panel (May 2025) has recommended fast tracking the MRFA, with an RFP (Request for Proposals) expected soon.
Make in India focus: The program explicitly aims for co-production and tech transfer. The execution model (finalized in 2025) will specify foreign OEMs partnering with Indian firms (likely HAL, Tata, etc.). HAL is thought to be a lead partner. Early briefing suggests the initial batch will be “flyaway” imports, followed by Indian assembly to ramp up capacity. This follows the Rafale model (36 imported + 18 built by HAL) but on a larger scale (114 planes).
Strategic need: The MRFA deal is crucial to reverse squadron decline. As IDRW notes, acquiring 114 modern fighters (over 6 new squadrons) would replace retiring MiG-21/29/Mirage jets and secure technological advantages against China/Pakistan. The delay of a decade (the MMRCA process dragged from 2007 into the 2010s) has already cost the IAF dearly. Now, “the IAF is preparing to move forward” on MRFA. But even with an RFP in late 2025, actual deliveries will not begin until the early 2030s.
In sum, while the MRFA could eventually add valuable squadrons, it remains a future solution. Meanwhile, de facto, the IAF has only about 30 jets per year being inducted (mostly Su-30MKI upgrades, Rafales, and LCAs) – well below the 40/year that leaders say is needed. Critics point out that until MRFA, India’s choices rely heavily on outdated fleets, leaving the force brittle.
Budget and Procurement Bottlenecks
India allocates a sizeable defense budget (₹6.2 lakh crore or $75 billion in 2024–25), but procurement processes hinder timely modernization. A recent analysis bluntly calls the acquisition system a “bureaucratic quicksand.” Key issues include:
Delays and Red Tape: The Defense Acquisition Procedure (DAP) involves 12 stages of approvals. In practice, this causes years long delays. For example, the Tejas program sanctioned in 1983 – took 36 years for its first squadron. The Army’s Integrated Battle Group (IBG) reorganization languished for 4+ years with no progress. Such inertia often renders equipment obsolete by the time it arrives, a major problem given fast paced tech cycles.
HAL Production Shortfalls: HAL, India’s aerospace manufacturing giant, repeatedly misses targets. As of 2024, HAL had delivered only 36 Tejas (Mk1) out of 123 on order. The Mk1A production bottlenecks (engine supply, structural issues) have meant that no Mk1A was delivered by mid 2025. Similar woes afflicted the indigenous Light Combat Helicopter and Su-30 upgrades. HAL’s chronic delays led the MoD to form a Defence Empowerment Committee (led by the Defence Secretary) to inject urgency into projects. In 2025, Parliament even passed a ₹67,000 Cr supplement to finance 97 Tejas Mk1As (above the 83 order), partly reflecting this push.
Imports vs. Make in India Dilemma: India strives for self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat). However, even as it develops domestic jets, 70% of defense equipment is still imported. Strategic procurement is thus caught between buying “off-the-shelf” to plug gaps (e.g. 36 Rafales, tanker/AWACS deals) and nurturing domestic industry (LCA, AMCA, etc.). This tension can slow decision making; for instance, debates over foreign vs. local content delayed some deals. Corruption scandals (AgustaWestland, Rafale) have also sown mistrust and bureaucratic caution.
Budget Constraints: Although the budget is large, defense spending as a percentage of GDP is declining. Competing priorities (infrastructure, welfare) limit allocatable funds. Moreover, major capital acquisitions (fighters, ships, missiles) often get cutback in favor of personnel or revenue needs. This leaves inadequate funds to recapitalize all services at once.
Overall, procurement inertia and budgetary pressures have exacerbated India’s fighter shortage. Each delayed contract or slow-build jet means one more squadron precariously left vacant. Defense thinkers warn that without streamlining procurement (e.g. fewer layers of approval, engaging private sector) and prioritizing critical buys, the IAF will remain chronically understrength.
Chinese Air Power: Edge in Numbers and Technology
China’s air force is now one of the world’s largest and most modern. Key points of comparison:
Fleet Size: The PLAAF fields on the order of 50 fighter squadrons (2000 combat jets). This includes the entire spectrum from older J-7 (MiG-21 copies) to 4th-gen J-11/16, to cutting edge J-10, J-20 stealth fighters (over 200 J-20s in service), and soon J-31 stealth prototypes. China is continuing to add jets rapidly; Jane’s analysis notes PLAAF inducted 70+ J-20s between mid 2023 and mid-2024. By 2030, some predict China could have 800+ J-20s alone, potentially exceeding the entire IAF inventory.
Technological Edge: China is aggressively fielding 5th-generation fighters (J-20/Mighty Dragon, J-31/Gyrfalcon). It has also developed advanced missiles (PL-15 long-range AAMs, PL-21 hypersonic AAM). Its jets often incorporate large AESA radars, digital avionics, and networked capabilities comparable to Western 4.5-gen fighters. Importantly, China now exports and co-produces with Pakistan (e.g. the JF-17 program), spreading Chinese tech regionally. By contrast, India’s fleet still largely relies on 1980s–90s designs (MiGs, Mirage) with only a sprinkling of Rafales/AESA radars (on Su-30MKI, Mirage-2000UPG, Tejas Mk1A).
Force Posture: The PLAAF’s deployment along the Sino-Indian border and in the Indian Ocean is growing. China has deployed Su-30s and J-11s to Tibet (PLA Southwest) and is positioning more J-20 squadrons near the LAC. Additionally, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN Air Arm) now has Shenyang J-15 carrier fighters. All this means that in any Sino-Indian air engagement, India would face larger numbers and more modern aircraft. The strategic picture is stark: India’s fifth-generation ambitions lag a generation behind China’s reality.
In sum, China outnumbers and out-techs India in the air. As one analyst puts it, reducing the IAF to 25 squadrons (even of modern types) “risks undermining its deterrence posture” against a PLA with over 50 squadrons and stealth fighters. The disparity drives urgent calls for India to hasten Tejas/AMCA and secure MRFA jets, lest the quantitative gap widen further.
Pakistan’s Air Force: Modernization Drive
Pakistan remains a critical concern. Although its air arm is smaller (25 squadrons, 450–500 fighters), the PAF has undertaken an aggressive modernization in recent years:
JF-17 Thunder: The backbone of PAF’s fleet. About 150+ JF-17s have been built in Pakistan (Block-I, II, and III variants). The latest Block-III jets (with AESA radar, IRST, helmet mounted display) began inducting in 2023. Pakistan also recently showcased JF-17 exports (Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Myanmar) and is planning a next-gen “JF-17 PFX” to replace the oldest airframes. The JF-17 production line is reportedly expanding (22–24 jets/year delivered recently).
F-16 Fighting Falcons: Pakistan operates around 80–90 F-16s (Block 15/52), mostly upgraded under US/FMS programs. These remain potent multirole jets with modern missiles. Islamabad also briefly renamed F-16s as “F-21” to pitch to India in the MRFA tender. However, the U.S. supplies are now limited; Pakistan’s focus has shifted to Chinese jets.
J-10CE and J-31: China’s deepening role. In 2022–23 Pakistan took delivery of 30+ J-10CE fighters (export variant of China’s J-10C). These are larger, longer range fighters equipped with PL-15 missiles, and represent the PAF’s entry into 4.5-generation jets. Pakistan also claimed a deal to acquire Chengdu J-31 (“Gyrfalcon”) stealth jets, though details are murky. Even talk of a joint 5th gen project (with Turkey) is underway.
Survivability and Drones: The PAF has also bolstered AWACS (Saab 2000 Erieye) and inducted Turkish Akinci TB-2/UAVs to improve situational awareness. Improved Chinese surface to air missiles (HQ-9, HQ-16) add a formidable air defense umbrella over Pakistan.
The net effect is that Pakistan’s air power is resurging. Some estimates suggest the PAF could even approach numerical parity with India’s fighter count by 2035 if trends continue. Crucially, Islamabad is narrowing the gap in capabilities: the PAF’s new AESA radars, beyond visual range missiles (e.g. PL-15), and planned stealth jets threaten to negate India’s qualitative edge. In practical terms, India can no longer assume air superiority over Pakistan. Combined with smaller size, this means any conflict with Pakistan will be fought on a much tougher playing field than in the 1990s.
Regional Air Forces: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka
India’s neighborhood also merits context. Three adjacent countries have limited but modernizing air forces:
Bangladesh Air Force (BAF): Bangladesh maintains a modest fleet (50–60 fighters). It has about 8 MiG-29B/UBs (some upgraded) and 35 Shenyang F-7 (Chinese copy of MiG-21) aircraft. In 2024–25 Bangladesh finalized an upgrade for half its MiG-29s, extending their life to 2030. Under its “Forces Goal 2030” plans, Dhaka aims to replace all obsolete F-7s by 2034. Reportedly, Bangladesh has expressed interest in acquiring 20–32 new 4+ generation jets (e.g. the JF-17) to modernize cost-effectively. However, these upgrades are incremental; Bangladesh’s total fighter count will remain well below India’s.
Myanmar Air Force (MAF): The Myanmar junta has a small, aging air fleet. As of 2024, the MAF has inducted 6 Russian Su-30SME heavy fighters (delivered Dec 2024) and operates roughly 31 MiG-29 jets. It also bought 7 Pakistani JF-17 Block-2 fighters, but all of these have reportedly been grounded due to structural cracks. Most of Myanmar’s other jets (Chinese FTC-2000G “Q-5” fighter-bombers, J-7 trainers) are relics well beyond front-line capability. In short, Myanmar’s airpower is limited to tens of fighters and is not a peer threat to India.
Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF): Sri Lanka has the smallest air arm in the region. It fields a couple of squadrons (6–10 jets each) of IAI Kfir multi-role fighters (upgraded Israeli jets) and older Chinese Chengdu F-7 interceptors. The SLAF has no 4th generation jets. Its primary roles are maritime patrol and limited counter insurgency. Sri Lanka’s air force is not considered a strategic factor compared to India or even Bangladesh.
In summary, none of India’s smaller neighbors have air forces that challenge India. However, arbitrating influence in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal means India must remain mindful. Bangladesh’s modest upgrade and Myanmar’s limited Su-30 acquisition signify they aim for minimum deterrence. Yet India’s lead over them is far greater than that over China or Pakistan. A regional overview underscores that the primary threats remain Pakistan and China, not these smaller neighbors.
Indigenous Initiatives: Make in India Air Power
Amidst shortages, India is banking on domestic programs to reshape its airpower. The Make in India mantra drives projects like Tejas, AMCA, and helicopter programs. Key points:
LCA Tejas: Now in production at HAL’s Bengaluru and Nashik plants, Tejas has become the only combat jet truly built in India. The Mk1A variant (with AESA radar and upgraded systems) is meant to be the workhorse. HAL recently reorganized production (new assembly lines) to meet the 16–24 jets/year target. Tejas Mk2 (Medium Weight Fighter) is the bridge to 5th-gen, blending 4.5 gen tech (GE F414 engine, canards). Over 200 Tejas (Mk1/Mk1A/Mk2) could enter service through the 2030s if industry and funding hold up.
AMCA: Already mentioned, India’s first stealth fighter program is fully conceived domestically. The May 2025 cabinet decision involved private players (Tata, L&T) alongside DRDO/ADA. AMCA’s high indigenous content (>80%) aims to eventually project India into the fifth gen club. But it’s a long game; successful prototype and production lines won’t materialize until the 2030s.
Other aircraft: India has also developed the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH “Prachand”) and the basic trainer Kiran-II, and is working on the Naval LCA and unmanned systems. HAL and private firms (Tata, Mahindra, L&T) are increasingly involved, especially after the Empowerment Committee reforms. For example, private firms now supply key Tejas components (rear fuselages, etc.) to relieve HAL.
These projects embody India’s desire for self reliance in defense. However, the tempo must increase to stem the squadron decline. Experts note that while technology can partly offset fewer aircraft, sheer numbers still matter especially against large adversary forces. Until Tejas Mk1A/Mk2 and AMCA start filling cockpits, India’s indigenous jets remain promising future contributions, not instant fixes.
Two Front War Risks
India’s defense planning assumes a possible simultaneous conflict with Pakistan (west) and China (north). With current squadron levels, this scenario is highly perilous:
Numerical disadvantage: Facing Pakistan and China together, the IAF would be split between western and northern fronts. Analysts warn that dividing 30 squadrons between two theaters means about 10–15 squadrons per front, against 20+ Pakistani squadrons on the western side and dozens of Chinese squadrons on the northern side. The result is quantitative and qualitative asymmetry in each theater. Even the defense secretary’s committee notes that dual front operations with only 30 squadrons are inadequate.
Strain on resources: A multi front war would exhaust IAF assets rapidly. High intensity operations (CAPs, strikes) consume missiles, fuel, and create maintenance backlogs. With an older fleet, attrition and accident rates are also concerns (the IAF lost 200 aircraft in accidents from 2001–2021). Even training cycles would suffer as jets are pushed to the front.
Adversary readiness: By 2030, the PLA Air Force may field 300–400 fifth-gen jets (J-20) and hundreds of J-10A/B/C, giving China a layered, modern threat. Pakistan could acquire J-35 stealth fighters or more J-10s as part of its China partnership. In such a scenario, India would rely on Rafale (36 jets), Su-30MKI, upgraded MiG-29/Mirage, and Tejas against numerically superior foes.
These factors culminate in a grim consensus: the IAF is currently ill prepared for a simultaneous two front conflict. Even as a “punitive force” (as in Balakot 2019), the IAF demonstrated capability to strike, but sustained full scale war requires mass. The service has publicly urged the government to bridge the gap (e.g. demanding 40 new jets annually). Without rapid force build-up, the two front scenario could severely compromise India’s air dominance and deterrent.
Outlook to 2030: Trends and Projections
What will India’s fighter strength look like by 2030 if current trends persist?
One sobering projection (India Today Group) says that if no new orders beyond those already on contract are placed, the IAF’s squadron count could fall to just 25 by 2035. That scenario assumes retiring all 6 Jaguar, 3 MiG-29, and 3 Mirage squadrons over the next decade. However, that analysis also outlines mitigating factors:
Ordering the additional 97 Tejas Mk1As would add 5 squadrons, with deliveries into the early 2030s.
Early production of Tejas Mk2 (40–50 jets by 2035) could create 2–3 new squadrons.
Finalizing the MRFA 114-jet deal (European, American or Russian fighters) would inject 6 squadrons.
If these planned acquisitions materialize on time, the IAF could rebound to 30–35 squadrons by 2030. Indeed, a European defense journal projected 35–36 squadrons by the mid 2030s. Yet even this “best-case” leaves India short of the 42 mark.
By 2030, China is expected to be accelerating its fighter buildup (multiple J-20 squadrons, plus J-31 tests) and continuing export of J-10/JF-17 to allies. Pakistan may field its first J-35 jets and focus on net centric upgrades. Regional forces (Bangladesh, Myanmar) may see incremental new fighters but will remain smaller.
The strategic landscape implies that if India does not dramatically accelerate its fighter induction, the gap with adversaries will widen. A smaller fleet facing larger, more advanced enemies could embolden rivals and constrain India’s options in crises. Conversely, even a modest improvement in induction rates (through Tejas, MRFA, more Rafales/Su-30s) could stabilize squadron counts. Policymakers will weigh whether to continue delaying new planes and hope technological force multipliers suffice, or to spur a surge in purchases and production.
Strategic Recommendations and Government Initiatives
Recognizing the urgency, the government and IAF are taking steps to narrow the gap:
Fast track Orders: A June–July 2025 review committee (chaired by the Defence Secretary) recommended expediting pending deals. Its report, submitted in March 2025, prompted approval of a ₹67,000 crore contract for 97 additional Tejas Mk1As. This will boost Tejas output to 180 jets by 2031. In parallel, the Defence Acquisition Council (Feb 2025) cleared proposals (₹84,560 crore) for six more mid air refuelers and AEW&C aircraft. These enablers improve sustained operations.
MRFA Push: The same committee green lit moving ahead with the 114-MRFA program. An RFP (likely in late 2025) is expected to invite bids under Make in India terms. Major players (Boeing, Dassault, Saab, etc.) are actively pitching their jets. Official sources indicate the MoD wants significant local content, possibly with HAL or Tata as production partner. If concluded, MRFA could inject much needed jets by the early 2030s.
Indigenous Focus: The Centre has signaled support for “Atmanirbhar” programs. In May 2025, the government issued a blueprint inviting public and private industry to participate in AMCA’s development and production. Government funding (₹10,000 Cr approved for Mk2) and streamlined processes (post empowerment panel) aim to accelerate HAL. Private firms are now co-producing Tejas components (Alpha Tocol, private fuselage shops). New facilities (third assembly line at Nashik) are planned for Tejas Mk1A and Mk2.
Budgetary Support: India’s defence budget is rising slightly year on year (4.7% uptick in 2024–25), but still below requirements. Policymakers face pressure to allocate more to capital (aircraft procurement) over revenue. Some analysts advocate increasing defense spend from 2.2% to 2.5–3% of GDP, to free up funds for jets and missiles.
Procurement Reforms: Recognizing bottlenecks, the MoD is revising policies. Recent reforms include delegating more powers to single stage, single-vendor proposals and pushing more projects on Fast Track Procedure (FTP). The “Make I” category and Innovations for Defense Excellence (iDEX) are meant to onboard private industry quickly. A Defence Export Strategy (2020) aims to turn India into an equipment exporter, partly by co-development (Tejas interest from Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia).
Force Structure Review: The IAF’s leadership has repeatedly reaffirmed the 42 squadron goal. They stress numbers matter as much as technology. Future doctrine planning (Vision 2050) is said to consider optimal force mix, including more UCAVs and 5th/6th-gen jets. Exercises like Gaganshakti and Iron Fist are testing new command structures to maximize impact of limited jets.
Recommendations from analysts include: prioritize the top-up of squadrons at any cost (even more Rafales or F-16s if needed), broaden OEM competition (e.g. consider F-35 or Su-35 if available), and deepen pilot training to raise qualitative edge. Some also suggest buying used jets (like ex-Swiss F-18s or Israeli F-16s) to fill gaps. On the high tech front, investments in missiles (BVR, air to ground), drones (like the MQ-9 Reaper), and integrated networks can partly offset fewer manned fighters.
Ultimately, closing the fighter gap requires political will. The recent panel report and MoD approvals show the establishment recognizes the problem. But the needle must move faster. The window to prepare for China’s growing air power and Pakistan’s modernization is narrow. If by 2030 India’s fighters grow only modestly, the strategic landscape in South Asia will be far more dangerous. The government faces a clear choice: continue at the current pace and accept a thinner shield, or act decisively now to rebuild India’s air wings.
Sources: Authoritative defense studies, think tank analyses, and media reports have documented these trends and figures. Each citation corresponds to published data or expert commentary on India’s air power and its regional context.
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