As 2026 approaches, the Ganga water-sharing arrangement between India and Bangladesh has returned to diplomatic focus. The reason is straightforward: the 1996 Ganga Water Treaty, signed for a fixed period of 30 years, is nearing its expiry. While recent online commentary has framed this moment as a looming geopolitical flashpoint, the reality is more complex, technical, and far less dramatic.
- Why the 1996 Treaty Exists and Why Farakka Matters
- How Water Is Shared Under the Treaty
- Historical Flow Data and Seasonal Variability at Farakka
- How Much Water Does Bangladesh Actually Receive Under the Treaty?
- Why Bangladesh Is Pressing for Clarity Ahead of 2026
- India’s Calculus: Negotiating from Stability, Not Pressure
- The Teesta Question and Its Political Shadow
- What Failure Would Actually Look Like and Why It Is Unlikely
- The Real Story Behind the 2026 Deadline
The treaty’s expiry does not automatically imply conflict or disruption. Instead, it obliges both countries to reassess a framework that was designed using hydrological data and climatic assumptions from the late twentieth century conditions that no longer fully apply.
Why the 1996 Treaty Exists and Why Farakka Matters
The Ganga Water Treaty was negotiated to regulate dry-season water sharing at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal. Farakka plays a dual role. It ensures adequate water flow for the Bhagirathi–Hooghly system, which supports navigation and the operational viability of Kolkata port, and it also serves as the control point from which water enters Bangladesh as the Padma River.
The treaty applies only to the lean season, from 1 January to 31 May, when natural river flows are lowest. During this period, water availability is assessed in 10-day cycles, and sharing is determined accordingly. This structure was deliberately designed to be adaptive rather than rigid, recognising the variability of monsoon-fed rivers.
How Water Is Shared Under the Treaty
Contrary to common claims, the treaty does not fix a permanent quantity of water for either side. Instead, allocations depend on how much water is available at Farakka during each 10-day period. At lower flows, India and Bangladesh share water equally. At higher flows, preset ceilings ensure that both sides receive a workable minimum without depriving the other.
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A limited assurance mechanism exists during a critical stretch of the dry season, but even this operates on an alternating basis and is supplemented by an emergency consultation clause if flows fall abnormally low. In practical terms, the treaty prioritises predictability and communication, not absolute guarantees.
This design has allowed the agreement to function without collapse for nearly three decades.
Historical Flow Data and Seasonal Variability at Farakka
One limitation of most public discussions on the Ganga Water Treaty is the absence of long-term flow context. The treaty’s allocation logic was built on historical discharge data collected over several decades, particularly focusing on dry-season averages rather than annual totals.
During the lean season, average flows at Farakka have historically ranged between 60,000 and 85,000 cusecs, with sharp intra-seasonal fluctuations. January typically records higher availability than April or early May, when upstream withdrawals, reduced snowmelt contribution, and rising temperatures combine to suppress flow levels.
This variability is precisely why the treaty avoided a fixed-volume guarantee. Instead, it adopted a threshold-based allocation model, recalculated every ten days. From a hydrological standpoint, this makes the treaty more resilient than rigid quota-based agreements, but it also means that perceived shortfalls can occur in specific periods even when annual averages appear stable.
How Much Water Does Bangladesh Actually Receive Under the Treaty?
Public discourse often treats Bangladesh’s water share as a single number, but in practice, Bangladesh’s receipts vary significantly across the dry season.
In high-flow lean years, when discharge exceeds 75,000 cusecs at Farakka, Bangladesh receives more than 45,000 cusecs during several 10-day blocks. In moderate-flow conditions, allocations hover near the 35,000–40,000 cusecs range. Only during extreme low-flow periods does the emergency consultation mechanism become relevant.
Importantly, Bangladesh receives substantially higher volumes outside the treaty window, during the monsoon and post-monsoon months, when the Padma carries far greater discharge than any dry-season allocation. The treaty does not govern these months because flow abundance makes formal sharing unnecessary.
This seasonal asymmetry is often ignored when arguments focus solely on dry-season stress.
Why Bangladesh Is Pressing for Clarity Ahead of 2026
Bangladesh’s concerns are rooted less in politics and more in structural dependence. Large parts of its agriculture rely on consistent dry-season flows from transboundary rivers. Even small reductions can affect crop cycles, fisheries, and salinity levels in downstream regions.
What has changed since 1996 is the climate context. Heatwaves are more frequent, evaporation rates are higher, and dry seasons are becoming less predictable. From Dhaka’s perspective, a treaty drafted three decades ago needs recalibration to reflect these realities. This explains Bangladesh’s emphasis on predictability, longer treaty duration, and stronger institutional mechanisms rather than any sudden aggressive posture.
India’s Calculus: Negotiating from Stability, Not Pressure
India approaches the 2026 talks with considerable leverage but little incentive for escalation. As the upper riparian state controlling Farakka, India already shapes the physical terms of the agreement. At the same time, India and Bangladesh are deeply interlinked through trade, power transmission, and transit access to the Northeast.
For New Delhi, the primary concerns are domestic. West Bengal’s water needs, the operational health of Kolkata port, and flexibility in future water management all weigh heavily in negotiations. Any renewed treaty will have to balance these internal considerations against Bangladesh’s demand for predictability.
Importantly, India’s water diplomacy with Bangladesh has historically been insulated from the confrontational dynamics seen in its relations with Pakistan. The two cases are neither legally nor politically comparable.
The Teesta Question and Its Political Shadow
Although not part of the Ganga Water Treaty, the unresolved Teesta river issue frequently enters discussions as a backdrop. Bangladesh views progress on Teesta as a signal of India’s broader commitment to equitable water sharing, while India’s federal structure particularly the role of West Bengal has slowed movement on that front.
This overlap adds political sensitivity but does not legally determine the fate of the Ganga agreement.
What Failure Would Actually Look Like and Why It Is Unlikely
If negotiations extend beyond the treaty’s expiry, existing institutional mechanisms allow for temporary arrangements and continued data sharing. The most plausible outcomes involve short-term extensions, revised formulas with periodic reviews, or the incorporation of joint basin studies to account for climate variability.
A complete breakdown would harm both countries economically and politically, making it the least likely scenario.
The Real Story Behind the 2026 Deadline
The approaching expiry of the Ganga Water Treaty is not a signal of imminent confrontation but of necessary adaptation. Water stress in South Asia is intensifying, and agreements framed in an earlier climatic era are under pressure everywhere.
The 2026 negotiations will test whether India and Bangladesh can modernise one of the region’s most significant water-sharing frameworks without politicising it. If past practice is any indication, the outcome is more likely to be incremental and technical than dramatic.
For all the noise surrounding the issue, the real story lies not in speculation about conflict, but in how quietly and methodically two neighbours renegotiate shared access to a river that sustains hundreds of millions of people.
